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ABSTRACT
The Department of Defense is currently entrenched in a procurement system that does not respect
the intellectual property of its contractors. This, in turn, has led to research and development firms'
increasing reluctance to contract with the Department of Defense. As a result of this reluctance, the
United States has increasingly relied upon weapons systems that, in many cases, have not
significantly evolved since the Vietnam War. In order to revive the United States' flagging military
technology sector Congress should look to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act in
order to encourage the private sector's creation of defense-oriented innovations. The proposed
changes would merely extend a modicum of protection to Department of Defense contractors,
something that they don't currently have. The goal of this proposal is to encourage innovation in
our laboratories in order to ensure victory on the battlefield and the safe return of American soldiers
from overseas.

Copyright © 2007 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Daniel Larson, Comment, Yesterday's Technology, Tomorrow:
How the Government's Treatment of IntellectualPropertyPrevents
Soldiers from Receiving the Best Tools to Complete TheirMission, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 171 (2007).

YESTERDAY'S TECHNOLOGY, TOMORROW: HOW THE GOVERNMENT'S
TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PREVENTS SOLDIERS FROM
RECEIVING THE BEST TOOLS TO COMPLETE THEIR MISSION
DANIEL LARSON*

The value of an idea lies in the using of it.
Thomas Edison 1

INTRODUCTION

The bullet passed through Lance Cpl. Juan Valdez-Castillo as his
Marine patrol moved down a muddy urban lane. It was a single shot. The
lance corporal fell against a wall, tried to stand and fell again....

[His Sergeant] grabbed the corporal by a strap and dragged him across
a muddy road to a line of tall reeds .... He put down his weapon, shouted
orders and cut open the lance corporal's uniform, exposing a bubbling
2
wound.

This scenario has played out hundreds of times since the Afghani and Iraqi wars
4
began. 3 American soldiers depend upon body armor to protect them from attacks.
Specifically, the U.S. military uses Interceptor Body Armor for protection against
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1 Howard M. Bremer, Presentation to National Association of State Universities and Land
Grant Colleges: The First Two Decades of the Bayh-Dole Act as Public Policy (Nov. 11, 2001),
http://www.nasulgc.org/COTT/Bayh-Dohl/Bremer-speech.htm (last visited July 14, 2007) (on file
with author).
2 C.J. Chivers, SniperAttacksAdding to Peri]of US. Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at Al.
3 See Iraq Coalition Casualties, http://www.icasualties.org/oif/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
4 Soo Matthew Cox, Enter the Interceptor: Light Infantry Gets Even Lighter With Now Armor,
ARMY TIMES, July 2006, http://www.pointblankarmor.com/news/articles/armytimes-article.html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
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small-arms fire. 5 However, the protection afforded by such body armor is often
6
inadequate and leaves soldiers susceptible to harm.
Much of the technology the United States depends on in battle, such as
Interceptor Body Armor, is no longer cutting edge. 7 America's laser guided bombs
differ only slightly from technology used in the Vietnam War. 8 Meanwhile, our
stealth technology is now over thirty years old. 9 The lack of modernization has been
the target of speculation since 1991, when the Semiconductor Industry Association
reported that Nintendo games had a better processor than the latest generation
military equipment at the time. 10 More alarming is that the situation is not
improving. America's newest fielded technology, the Land Warrior system, 1 utilizes
a 400 megahertz processor that "[wiould have been bleeding edge-in 1999."12 This
means that soldiers are being sent to war relying on technology that may be less
advanced than the chipsets used in current mobile phones. 13
Many countries are now either as advanced, or significantly more advanced,
than the United States in nine of twenty critical military technologies identified by
the Department of Defense ("DoD").14 A thriving international arms market supplied
5 See
Interceptor Body Armor,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/
interceptor.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Interceptor body-armor consists of an Outer Tactical
Vest ('OTV") and a number of small arms protective inserts ("SAPI plates"). Id. An OTV consists of
a Kevlar weave able to stop 9 mm rounds. Id. SAPI plates consist of a boron carbide ceramic, with a
spectra shield backing, able to stop a 7.62 mm round fired from a weapon with a muzzle velocity of
2,750 feet per second. Id.
6 See Ann Scott Tyson, Body-Armor Gaps Are Shown to EndangerTroops, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
2006, at A05 (reporting better protection to the chest, back, sides, and shoulder areas could have
prevented up to eighty percent of fatalities); see also Michael Moss, Struggle for Iraq: Troop Shields,
Pentagon Study Links Fatalitiesto Body Armor N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at Al (stating forty-two
percent of the Marine casualties dying from isolated torso injuries could have been prevented with
improved protection in the areas surrounding the plated areas of the vest, an additional twentythree percent might have been saved with side plates extending below the arms, and fifteen percent
may have benefited from shoulder plates); Interview by Margaret Warner with Roger Charles,
Lietenant Colonel (Ret.), United States Marine Corps, during NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, in
Washington D.C. (Jan. 11, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle east/jan-june06/armorl
11.html (stating SAPI plates often "[turn into] a bunch of gravel" after a one round impact).
7 Soo Colonel Jeanne C. Sutton, Marrying Commercial and Mitary Technologies: A Now
Strategy for MaintainingTechnologicalSupremacy, 1 ACQUISITION REV. Q. 219, 220 (Summer 1994)
(stating that many of the systems depended on by the military are outdated).
S Id.
9 Id.
10Id. at 224.
11See David Coburn, Land Warrior System: Inside the Pentagon's New High-Tech Gear
POPULAR MECHANICS, May, 2007, at 40, available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/
military-law/4215725.html (stating the land warrior system includes an eyepiece that acts as a full
color computer screen, a boom mike, a laser rangefinder, thermal sight, night vision, digital camera,
GPS unit, and a multiband radio). These various sub-systems are intended to keep the soldier
"wired" into the Army's greater network. Id.
12Noah Shachtman, The Arm 's New Land Warrior Gear: Why Soldiers Don't Like It,
POPULAR MECHANICS, May, 2007, at 74, available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/military-law/4215715.html.
13See Ryan Block, iPhoneprocessor found: 620MHz ARM CPU ENGADGET.COM, Jul. 1, 2007,
http://www.engadget.com/2007/07/01/iphone-processor-found-620mhz-arm/
(noting that the Apple
iPhone appears to come equipped with a 620-MHz processor).
14See Sutton, supra note 7, at 220 (noting that Sweden, Israel, and France have developed
weapon technologies on par with or technologically superior to those produced by the United States).
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by these countries further exacerbates this reality. 15
This means potential
adversaries of the United States can purchase weapons that may be more advanced
than those currently used by the United States. 16 In order to prevent defeat on the
battlefield, we must identify and resolve the cause of flagging U.S. military
technology.
The protection provided by the patent system is the major impetus for the
creation of new technology and inventions in America. 17 However, the lack of new
and innovative technologies for American troops evinces an underlying problem with
respect to patent legislation.18 The current system discourages the private sector
from creating defense-oriented innovations. 19 This situation is due to judicial
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 149820 and clauses in 35 U.S.C. § 200 ("Bayh-Dole Act")
21
that penalize inventors for failing to observe technical formalities.
15See id. (stating potential adversaries may be able to purchase arms on the international
arms black market that are superior to those provided to U.S. troops).
16See id. at 223 (noting that General Custer was defeated at the Battle of Little Big Horn by
Native Americans who, despite having no industrial capacity themselves, were able to obtain better
weaponry than General Custer's soldiers).
17 Greg Blonder, Cutting Through the Patent Thicket, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2005/tc20051220_827695.htm
(stating "[t]he
patent system was designed to encourage the free flow of ideas, in exchange for a temporary
monopoly."); Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Sec'y of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and
Trademarks, Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software -Related Inventions
(Feb. 10, 1994), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/arlington/vahrng.pdf. "Our
intellectual property systems were established over 200 years ago to promote and protect innovation
in all fields of technology.
If these systems are functioning properly, they will provide an
appropriate level of protection and encourage innovation." Id.
18 April L. Butler, Note, Stealing Thunder From Government Contractors: Thwarting the
Intent of the Bayh-Dole Act in Campbell Plastics v. Brownlee, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 477, 495 (2006)
("Three-fourths of the country's top 75 information technology companies will not do research with
the Government, citing the difficulty in contracting with the Government and treatment of
intellectual property in R&D contracts." (quoting Towa-rd Greater-Public-Private Collaborationin
Research and Development.*How the Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights is Minimizing
Innovation in the Federal Gov.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Procurement
Policy of the H. Comm. on Gov. Reform, 107th Cong. 2 (July 17, 2001))) (statement of Rep. Tom
Davis).
19Id.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006). Section 1498(a) reads, in part:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy
shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture.
Id. § 1498(a). See Butler, supra note 18, at 495. See also Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist
App-roaeh to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 587, 626 (2005) [hereinafter
Cahoy, Incrementalist]. The value of a patent right relates almost solely to the ability to profit. Id.
Therefore, the ability to collect compensation for infringement (damages) is of the utmost
importance. Id. Failure to provide for adequate damages can reduce the incentive to pursue a
patent. Id.
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006) (stating that inventions made under federal contracts are to
be disclosed within a reasonable time or the government will receive title in the subject invention);
48 C.F.R. 52.227-11(c)(1) (stating a reasonable time is two months); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 252.227-7039 (2006) (stating the DoD requires interim
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This comment addresses the U.S. government's failure to attract inventors to
develop protection for soldiers. Section I of this comment discusses the role of
contractors in meeting the needs of the military. This section also provides an
overview of the U.S. patent system and the relevant history of both § 1498 and the
Bayh-Dole Act. Section II analyzes how legislation affects the dissemination of new
products and technologies to the battlefield. Section III proposes amending § 1498 to
better compensate patent holders, and amending the Bayh-Dole Act to reflect a
greater respect for contractors' intellectual property rights when dealing with the
government. Finally, section IV concludes that there needs to be a fundamental
change in current patent legislation in order to adequately support U.S. troops.

I. BACKGROUND: PROCUREMENT OF SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY
This section outlines how the DoD acquires necessary supplies, equipment, and
technology. Subsection A explains the different duties of contractors who provide
supplies for the government and contractors who perform research for the
government. Subsection B overviews the U.S. patent system and § 1498. Finally,
subsection C describes the Bayh-Dole Act.

A. Government Contraetors

1. ContractorsBoth In and Out of the Science and Technology Comm unity
The DoD relies on contractors to furnish the military with necessary supplies
and equipment, which as a whole, range from individual rations to body armor and
M-16 rifles. 22 As of 2005, there were over 45,000 contractors that provided goods and
services to the DoD, with each contract valued at over $25,000.23 The sheer number
of contractors that the DoD requires to feed, transport, and arm the military
indicates their vital importance to the military's ability to function. 24 However, while

reports every twelve months and a final report three months following the completion of the project,
with a failure to disclose resulting in the government taking title).
22 Cf Wornick Co., Military Feeding Systems, http://www.wornick.com/military (last visited
Nov. 9, 2007) (stating the Wornick company is a major supplier of the military's Meals Ready to Eat
('MREs")); U.S. Army, Army Fact File M-16 Rifle, http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/
individual/ml6.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (stating that Colt Manufacturing and Fabrique
Nationale Manufacturing Inc. produce the military's assault rifles); BAE Systems, Mobility and
Protection
Systems,
Individual
Equipment
Systems,
http://adg.armorholdings.com/
default.aspx?pid=70 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (stating BAE Systems' Mobility & Protection Systems
division supplies the military with "[b]ody armor, vests, hydration systems, assault packs, helmets
and other protective products").
23 See Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2005 DoD
Contractors, www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense-ethics/resource-library/FY05-Contractors.pdf.
24 See

id.
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these types of contractors are important, even more important are contractors who
belong to the science and technology ("S&T")community.

25

The DoD relies on members of the S&T community for innovations that the DoD
can incorporate into its weapon and defense systems. 26 The United States military
depends on these systems to ensure victory on the battlefield. 27 However, these
systems often lack the innovations promised to soldiers and are past due and over
budget.28

2. Failureto Secure Innovations on Time and Within Budget
Numerous explanations are given for the failure to provide innovative defenseoriented products on time and within budget. For instance, the DoD attributes the
slow development of DoD inventions to its lack of a "strong influence at the corporate
level to guide . . . technology investments." 29
If the DoD cannot persuade
corporations to create necessary technologies, innovative defense-oriented products
30
will not reach soldiers who are at risk on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") attributes the slow
development of defense-oriented inventions to the DoD's failure to implement gated
reviews ("reviews").31 The goal of these reviews is to provide a framework for the
development of an invention prior to its inclusion in a DoD product. 32 The GAO
states that the DoD's failure to implement these reviews results in immature
technology being included in products, 33 thus causing cost overruns, schedule delays,
and performance shortfalls of military equipment. 34
25 See GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-06-883, BEST PRACTICES: STRONGER
PRACTICES NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOD TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION PROCESSES 1 (2006) [hereinafter
BEST PRACTICES] ([T]he DoD relies on the technological superiority of its weapon systems and
armed forces to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad .. ");see also Lawrence B. Ebert, On
Patent Quality and Reform, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 1068, 1072-74 (stating the
importance of having a technological advantage over adversaries in war). "On the third day of the
Gettysburg battle, two units of Federal cavalry ...armed with Spencer rifles, pushed back a
superior force by virtue of having the technological superiority of repeating rifles against single shot

weapons." Id.
26 See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 7 (stating the DoD relies on the S&T community to
conduct the basic, applied, and advanced research before acquiring the technology to a product).
27See supra text accompanying note 25.
28 GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-06-257T, DOD ACQUISITION OUTCOMES: A
CASE FOR CHANGE 1 (2005) [hereinafter CASE FOR CHANGE] (stating that while U.S. weapons are the
best in the world, the time it takes to field them and the cost it takes to develop them are usually off
by twenty to fifty percent). "When costs and schedules increase, quantities are cut, and the value for
the warfighter-as well as the value of the investment dollar-is reduced." Id.
29BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3.
30 Id. at 3-4.
31 Id. at 25; see also CASE FOR CHANGE, supra note 28, at 6-7 (noting that DoD policy provides
for a framework that makes developers ask themselves at key decision points whether technology is
developed enough to move onto the next stage of development, but the policy is rarely enforced,
leading to immature technologies being implemented in defense products).
32 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 9 (noting that reviews ensure a technology's relevance
and feasibility prior to being included in an end product).
33Id. at 7.
34See id. at 1.
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Finally, the failure of the DoD to secure innovative systems on time and within
budget has been attributed to the government's policy regarding intellectual
property.35
Currently, this policy, coupled with the government's failure to
adequately compensate inventors for a "taking" of their invention, leads members of
36
the S&T community to be less willing to contract with the government.
37
Consequently, there is less competition for contracts, which results in higher prices
38
and fewer innovative products reaching soldiers.

B. The Patent System, § 1498, and the Bayh -DoleAct
This subsection reviews the rights of patent holders in the United States under
current legislation. Subpart 1 provides an overview of the U.S. patent system.
Subpart 2 explains § 1498 and its progenitors. Finally, subpart 3 discusses the policy
behind Bayh-Dole and its implementation in practice.

1. The US. PatentSystem
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to establish a federal system of
patents in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 39 Patents
encourage inventors to create useful devices for the public. 40 Additionally, the patent
system encourages other inventors to "design around" existing patents, leading to
41
further innovations that benefit the public.

During the term of the patent, the patent owner may enjoin any entity, 42 other
44
than the U.S. government, 43 from making, using, or selling the patented invention.
See Butler, supra note 18, at 495-96.
See supra text accompanying note 18.
37 See 48 C.F.R. 16.104(a) (2006) (noting effective price competition will normally result in
realistic pricing). "Competition is the keystone policy of Federal acquisition." Effective Competition
in Government Procurement, http://fedpubseminars.com/seminar/govproc.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2007).
'3 See CASE FOR CHANGE, supra note 28, at 1.
3)U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4035 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). The subject matter may be "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter .. " Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (requiring that the
invention not be obvious to a person "having ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter
pertains.").
41Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Ciiro: A Reevaluation of Compensation
Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 131-32 (2002) [hereinafter
Cahoy, C/p9ro] (stating that one of the benefits of the patent system is that it provides an opportunity
for other inventors to "design around" another person's patent, resulting in more innovation (citing
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992))).
42 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839-41 (2006) (holding a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction under the Patent Act must demonstrate: (1) irreparable injury; (2)
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance
of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction).
43See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889,
901 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (stating the purpose of § 1498 is to "cloak with immunity from injunction" types of
activity determined to be necessary to achieve U.S. goals or interests).
'35

36
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Additionally, a patent-holder may collect damages resulting from infringement of her
patent. 45 These damages can either take the form of a reasonable royalty46 or a
calculation of lost profits. 47 In exchange for this protection, the patent holder agrees
to fully disclose her invention.48

2. PatentHolder Rights Against the Government
Patent litigation involving the government falls under a different legal theory
than lawsuits between private parties. 49 Title 28 of U.S.C. § 1338 governs patent
litigation between private parties. 50 In contrast, a patent holder seeking damages
from the government is constrained by the tenets of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.51

a. The Act of 1910
When Congress passed the Act of 1910, the government waived its sovereign
immunity in patent infringement litigation. 52 This waiver was in recognition of the
injustice levied upon inventors who, prior to the Act of 1910, had no recourse in the
case of governmental infringement. 53 However the Act of 1910 failed to limit a
44

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).

45 35 U.S.C. § 284 (stating the injured party shall be awarded damages adequate to compensate

for the infringement, "but in no event less than a reasonable royalty ..
").
46 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y 1970), affd,
446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (stating a reasonable royalty is the
hypothetical amount that a licensor (the patentee) and a licensee (the infringer) would have agreed
upon if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement).
47 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS I1, DONALD C. REILEY III & ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 20:56 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that patent owners may either recover lost profits or a
reasonable royalty). For a patent owner to recover lost profits she must prove (1) a causal
relationship between the infringement and her loss of profits, and (2) a reasonable probability that
she would have made the infringing sales that the infringer made. Id.
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it ... as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains ... to make and use the same .... "); see also Cahoy, Incrementalist,supra note
20, at 598 (stating '[i]t has been long recognized that the award of government property rights can
serve as an innovation support mechanism by bringing information to the public.").
49 See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating claims brought
under § 1498 are not analogous to suits between private parties).
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1498; David M. Schlitz & Richard J. McGrath, Patent Infringement Claims
Against the United States Government, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 351, 353-54 (2000) (noting patent
infringement cases between private parties are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and sound in tort,
whereas actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 against the government are based upon an eminent
domain theory).
52 See Act of June 25th, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
53 See Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912) (stating prior to the
Act of 1910 the power to sue the United States for the taking of a patent did not exist, unless it was
established that there was a breach of contract between the patent holder and the United States);
see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 663
(1999) (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (providing a brief history of the circumstances
surrounding the legislation waiving sovereign immunity).
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plaintiffs ability to enjoin an infringing government contractor. 54 Thus, a litigant
55
could enjoin the United States from procuring wartime materials from suppliers.
Any interruption in the supply chain can potentially result in an entire Army defeat
on the battlefield. 56 Realizing this, the Government amended the Act of 1910 with
57
The Naval Appropriations Act of 1918 ("Act of 1918").

. Emergence of§ 1498
The Act of 1918 relieved contractors "[f]rom liability ... for the infringement of
patents in manufacturing anything for the government."58 The act limited the
compensation a patent holder could receive from the government to a "reasonable
and entire" amount. 59 In 1948, the Act of 1918 was codified in § 1498.60 Under the
current law, § 1498 bars any equitable relief, and limits recovery to "reasonable and
entire compensation." 61
However, the statute fails to provide a method for
62
calculating damages when the government exercises eminent domain over a patent.

See Fla.PrepaidPostsecondaryEdue. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 663.
55 See Richard T. Ruzich, Government Patent and Copyright Infringement Overseas Under 28
US.C § 1498 (In the Shadow of the Rim Decisions), 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 405 (2006) (explaining the
ramifications of the Act of 1910 and the potential effect of the legislation on the American war
effort).
, See GOVT AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-07-234, DoD's HIGH RISK AREAS:
PROGRESS MADE IMPLEMENTING SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT FULL
EXTENT OF IMPROVEMENT UNKNOWN 1 (2007) (stating the supply chain dictates the "readiness and
operational capabilities" of the U.S. military); see generally MJR John A. Tokar, Logistics and the
Defeat of Gentleman Johnny,ARMY LOGISTICIAN, July-Aug. 2000, at 46 (noting that British supply
problems played a large role in their defeat at the hands of American rebels).
57 Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
See also
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 342 (1928) ('[The War Department is]
confronted with a difficult situation as the result of a recent decision by the Supreme Court affecting
the government's rights as to the manufacture and use of patented inventions, and it seems
necessary that amendment be made of the Act of June 25, 1910." (quoting letter dated April 20,
1918, from the Acting Secretary of the Navy)).
58 Richmond Screw Anehor Co., 275 U.S. at 343; see also id. at 345 (stating the intention of
Congress in enacting the new legislation was to stimulate contractors to manufacture supplies for
the war effort); id. at 342-43 (stating that prior to the enactment of the Naval Appropriations Act,
contractors were reluctant to contract with the government for fear of expensive litigation).
59 Id.

60Act of July 1, 1918, ch. 114, 40 Stat. 704 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1498). See also
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 700-01 n.22 (Fed. Cl. 2003). Under § 1498, the
unauthorized use of a patent by the government constitutes a "taking" of the patent under the
government's powers of eminent domain and not the manifestation of a compulsory license in the
patent. Zoltek Corp., 58 Fed. Cl. at 696-701.
61 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). See also David R. Lipson, We're Not Under Title 35 Anymore.*Patent
Litigation Against the United States Under 28 US.C. § 1498, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 243, 249 (2003)
(stating that a patentee may not obtain injunctive relief against the government or its contractors
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which strips patentees of their "most powerful and oft-used weapon").
62 Cahoy, Cipro, supra note 41, at 146 ("Title 28 U.S.C. § 1498 contains no directions or
limitations as to the grant of damages other than its mandate of 'reasonableness' and
'entirety'.... ).
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Instead, courts have relied on basic equitable principles of fairness 63 and technical
64
concepts of property law to calculate damages in those instances.
In appraising a patent holder's damages, the courts use one of three methods of
66
valuation.6 5 Generally, however, all formulations fall into two distinct categories:
68
(1) a reasonable royalty 67 or (2) lost profits.

1. Reasonable Royalty

A "reasonable royalty" is the bare minimum a patent-holder may recover from
an infringer. 69 In order to ensure the patentee will recover more than a nominal
amount of damages, a reasonable royalty sets a threshold that awards cannot fall
below.70
However, neither the legislature nor the courts provide a baseline
percentage that constitutes a "reasonable royalty."71 Instead, in the absence of an
"established royalty," courts base awards upon conjecture and supposition when
deciding the amount of the "reasonable royalty."7 2 As a result, courts usually
calculate damages using a hypothetical negotiation between the patent holder and
the government.7 3 This method, while flexible, results in wide discrepancies in the
63 Textronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977).

(3435 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (mandating patents "shall have the attributes of personal property.");
see Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating patents are a
form of property, and a patentee's exclusion of others from the use of a patent is the essence of
property law).
(35Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (stating the court uses either
(1) a determination of a reasonable royalty, (2) the award of lost profits, or (3) a percentage of the
amount saved by the government by the use of the patented invention). But see id. at 1172 (stating
savings to the government are usually only used when the court would encounter "great difficulty"
in calculating a reasonable royalty).
(3 Cahoy, Cipro, supra note 41, at 152-53 (stating the award of lost profits or a reasonable
royalty are two distinct categories that are mutually exclusive). Courts initially search for an
established royalty rate, if such a rate exists, it is the exclusive measure of damages. Id. at 157. If
an established royalty rate cannot be found, the courts entertain the possibility of lost profits. Id.
Finally, if lost profits are unavailable to the plaintiff, the court will apportion damages according to
a reasonable royalty. Id. at 157.
(37Id. at 153 (stating that a reasonable royalty for the use of the patented invention is the
baseline award that a patent owner is entitled to).
68 See Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (dictum) (stating
lost profits should be recoverable in at least some infringement actions against the government).
(3 See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
70 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) (guaranteeing reasonable and entire compensation).
71Id. (providing only a general idea of reasonable and entire compensation, without specifying
a minimum percentage); see, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 491 (Ct. Cl.
1994) (awarding one percent of the cost of the entire spacecraft as a reasonable royalty); Penda
Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 533, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1993) (awarding slightly less than ten percent of
the sales price of plastic pallets as a reasonable royalty); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 36 Fed.
Cl. 15, 26 (Ct. Cl. 1996) (awarding a fifteen percent royalty).
72 See Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933) (stating
[t]he whole notion of a reasonable royalty is a device in aid of justice, by which that which is really
incalculable shall be approximated .... ").
73 See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 348-49. A reasonable royalty is the
amount that a willing licensor (the patentee), and a willing licensee (the infringer) would have
agreed on if both had reasonably and voluntarily tried to reach an agreement prior to infringement
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percentage of damages awarded in one case as compared to another.7 4 Regardless,
the award of a reasonable royalty remains the prevalent form of damages awarded
under § 1498.5 This pattern is due to the paucity of cases in which the court finds
an established royalty and the difficulty in proving lost profits under current judicial
interpretation of § 1498.76

ii. Lost Profits

An award of lost profits against the government, while theoretically possible, is

78
This is partially due to a fear of overcompensating plaintiffs,
judicially created tests requiring plaintiffs to satisfy many elements, 79 and other lofty
standards that the patent-holder must fulfill.8 0 However, despite these reasons, the

rarely attainable.7 7

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") recently indicated a
willingness to award lost profits under a more lenient standard.8 1 This sudden
change in policy denotes recognition by the CAFC that a "reasonable royalty" may
82
not always adequately compensate plaintiffs for an infringement of their patents.

or litigation. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
74 See supra text accompanying note 71.
7 See Lipson, supra note 61, at 257 (stating the clear preference for the reasonable royalty
measure of damages under § 1498).
76 See Tektronix, Inc., 552 F.2d at 348-49 (requiring "clear and convincing" evidence of the lost
profits and stating that lost profits should only be awarded "only after the strictest proof that the
patentee would actually have earned and retained those sums in its sales to the Government.").
77 See Schlitz & McGrath, supra note 51, at 363 (noting that as of 2000, the Government had
successfully argued against an award of lost profits for the last sixty-eight years).
78 See Tektronix, Inc., 552 F.2d at 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (stating an award of lost profits may be so
high as to be considered excessive compensation, rather than just compensation); see also Amy L.
Landers, Let the Games Begin.*Incentives in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 362-63 (2006) (explaining the threat that over-compensation poses to
those engaged in producing goods). If awards are too high, and the cost of engaging in the
production of certain goods too risky, industry is likely to abandon otherwise beneficial activity. Id.
79 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating
in order to receive lost profits, the patentee must prove: (1) a demand for the infringed-upon product
in the relevant market; (2) an absence of non-infringing alternatives; (3) it had the manufacturing
and marketing capability to meet the demand; and (4) the amount of lost profits, due to the
infringing products). Failure to meet any of the elements resulted in a refusal of damages for lost
profits. Id.
80 Tektronix, Inc., 552 F.2d at 348 (stating a need for "clear and convincing" evidence that
plaintiff would have supplied all of the product the Government bought from third-parties, and
requiring that lost profits only be awarded under § 1498 only after the "strictest proof' that the
patent holder would have actually earned and retained the profits allegedly lost).
81 See Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (dictum)
(questioning the continuing validity of the "clear and convincing" standard, and positing that a
"preponderance of evidence" standard might be more appropriate in § 1498 cases).
A
"preponderance of the evidence" standard would require a plaintiff to prove that "but for the
infringement, it would have earned the profits it asserts were lost." Schlitz & McGrath, supra note
51, at 363-64.
82 See Schlitz & McGrath, supra note 51, at 363-64 (explaining that a "preponderance of the
evidence standard" is much more lenient than the current "clear and convincing" standard).
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e. The Bayb-Dole Act
Bayh-Dole has been lauded as "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to
be enacted in America over the past half century."8 3 This reverence is due to its early
success in attracting companies to contract with the government by allowing
84
members of the S&T community to take title in their federally funded inventions.

1.

The PolicyBehind the Bayh -DoleAct

Congress passed Bayh-Dole in 1980 to spur innovation8 5 and entice inventors to
patent their discoveries.8 6 At the time, Congress believed the lack of useful
inventions was due to the reluctance of contractors willing to do business with the
Federal Government.8 7 This belief was reinforced by studies that found the S&T
community disliked contracting with the government because: (1) the "title-taking"
policy of many government agencies;88 and (2) administrative hardship due to a lack
89
of uniform policy among government agencies.

ii.

Elimination of the "Title-Taking"Policy

Prior to the enactment of Bayh-Dole, the Government retained title to any
invention discovered during federally funded research. 90 This resulted in only a

83 Innovation's
Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002,
http ://www.economist.com/science/tq/displayStory.cfm?story-id= 1476653.

at

3,

available

at

84 Id.
85 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); see generallyJohn H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable

Pricing..A New Twist for March-In Rights Under the Bayh -Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER&
HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 149-50 (2005) (stating the rationale behind the drafting of the Bayh-Dole Act).
86,See Cahoy, Inerementalist, supra note 20, at 598 (stating that patenting an invention is
beneficial because it disseminates useful innovations to the public at large).
87 See SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC AND INT'L SCIENTIFIC PLANNING AND ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECH., 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT PATENT
POLICIES: REPORTS OF COMMITTEES, COMMISSIONS, AND MAJOR STUDIES xi (Comm. Print 1976)
(citing numerous studies noting contractors' wariness in dealing with the government).
8

Gregg S. Sharp, A Layman's Guide to Intellectual Property in Defense Contracts,

33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 99, 113 (2003) (explaining the primary and secondary reasons concerning why
contractors chose not to conduct R&D work for the Federal Government).
89 Id; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1676-77 (1996)
(noting prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, government agencies were free to choose whatever
patent policy best suited their missions).
The Atomic Energy Commission, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Health, Education, and Welware, Department of the Interior, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") followed a title policy. Id. The DoD and
National Science Foundation followed a license policy. Id.
90See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded
Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 398 (2006) (stating that prior to
the implementation of Bayh-Dole the majority of government agencies retained full title to
inventions developed with federal funding).
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small percentage of any of the patents actually being used. 91 Bayh-Dole allows
92
government-financed inventors to take title in their federally funded inventions.
This has resulted in a ten-fold increase in the number of patents applied for by
universities and small businesses. 93 Limitations exist, however, concerning the
inventor's title. These limitations are (1) the government's march-in rights, 94 and (2)
95
its ability to revoke title in a patent for improper disclosure of a discovery.

iii. The Government's March-In Rights

March-in rights allow the government to "march-in" and take back title to a
subject invention if contractors do not implement federally funded patents to develop
a product. 96
This mechanism exists primarily to discourage suppression of
technology by companies who license these patents only to prevent competitors from
gaining access to the underlying technology, while not actually using the technology
themselves. 97 Through this right, a governmental funding agency can force an
inventor to grant a license to another company if the current licensee is not utilizing
the patent effectively. 98 The decision to execute this march-in right rests solely in
the discretion of the funding government agency. 99 As such, many companies fear
the potential abuse of march-in rights by governmental agencies. 10 0 This fear can
deter a company from contracting with the government. 10 1 Other provisions of 35
U.S.C. § 203, which specifically limit the government's exercise of its march-in rights,
however, alleviate this fear. 102
Under § 203 the government can only take back title to a subject invention in
four circumstances. 103
If these are not present, the government is barred from
91 Id. at 397 (stating only four percent of the patents issued to the National Institute of Health,
NASA or the DoD were ever actually used).
92 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006); see also Sharp, supra note 88, at 116 (stating when a contractor
takes title in her invention, Bayh-Dole requires a grant-back of a "nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license" to the government); Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 1669 ("Firms may only
be willing to invest in the development of an invention if they hold exclusive rights, either in the
form of title or exclusive license, under a patent.").
93Raubitschek & Latker, supranote 85, at 150 (stating Bayh-Dole has created more than 2,200
companies, produced 260,000 new jobs, and contributed more than forty billion dollars annually to
the American economy since 1980).
W 35 U.S.C. § 203.
9 See Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243, 1247-50 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1); see also Raubitschek & Latker, supranote 85, at 155-56.
97 Sen. Birch Bayh, Statement to the National Institute of Health 2-5 (May 25, 2004),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/Senator-Birch-Bayh.pdf (last visited June 9, 2007).
98See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a).
9 Id.
100

See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND

RESEARCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: NAVIGATING THROUGH COMMERCIAL WATERS 4-12 (Version

1.1 2001) [hereinafter NAVIGATING] (noting the potential for liability if a contractor is not able to
achieve a return on its investment in a subject invention).
101 Id.

102 See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(a)(4).
103 See id. The government may exercise its march-in rights if it is "necessary": (1) because the
contractor has not taken steps to achieve practical application of the invention; (2) to alleviate
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marching-in under § 203.104 This provision, coupled with a lengthy administrative
process for determining if marching-in is appropriate,105 discourages the capricious
or routine use of the march-in authority by the government. 10 6 Because of this, it has
been said that the value of the march-in provision lies more in the threat of its use
than in its actual use. 10 7 Regardless, even the mere threat of the government
marching-in serves as motivation for contractors to effectively utilize subject
inventions. 108

iv. ImproperDisclosure

In addition to its march-in rights, the government has the right to claim title to
an invention if specific reporting formalities are not properly observed. 10 9
Contractors have largely dismissed this provision of Bayh-Dole for the last twenty
years. 110 However, the CAFC recently affirmed the viability of the provision in
Campbell Plastics Engineering & Manufacturing., Inc. v. Brownlee.11 1 The court's
decision in Campbell Plastics now poses a major risk to research and development
("R&D") firms that receive federal funding because the government may assert its
right to seize a firm's R&D for failure to comply with a procedural technicality. As a
result, firms are less inclined to do business with the government. 112 Regardless,
this provision is currently one of many risks inherent in contracting with the
government. On the other hand, Bayh-Dole has concurrently reduced the risk of

health or safety needs not reasonably satisfied by the contractor; (3) to meet requirements for public
use; or (4) to enforce the agreement that a substantial amount of the manufacturing of a product be
conducted in the United States. Id.
IW See id.
105 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, NIH OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, APPENDIX D:
ANALYSIS OF NIH OPTION UNDER CURRENT LAW, http://ott.od.nih.gov/researchtool/AppendixD.html
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
106 Id. (stating the exercise of march-in rights is a "cumbersome mechanism" that should not be
used on a routine basis).
107See Butler, supra note 18, at 500 (stating the march-in provision is "largely cosmetic"
(quoting The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S. 414 before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 160 (1979)) (statement of Admiral Rickover); see also
Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 85, at 157 (stating the government has not exercised its march-in
rights since 1980). Contra Mary Eberle, March-In Rights Under the Bayh-DoleAct: PublicAccess to
FederalyFunded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 175 (1999) (stating march-in rights
exist to address the possibility that companies may purchase technology, and not use it, to eliminate
the possibility of a competitor purchasing the technology and gaining market share).
108See NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-12 (noting that a government taking via the march-in
right can have serious financial consequences for a company that has invested time and money into
an invention). But see id. at 4-13 (noting that the government has not exercised its march-in right
to date).
109 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1) (2006).
110 GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No.GAO/RCED-99-242, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED INVENTIONS NEED REVISION, 6 (1999)
(stating only 6.1% of grantees properly report their inventions).
111 389 F.3d 1243, 1247-50 (holding that a failure to observe all formalities of invention
disclosure results in a forfeiture of title to the invention).
112 See discussion infra Section JI.A.2.b.
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contracting with the government by requiring uniformity amongst governmental
agencies. 113

v. UniformityAmongst Government Agencies
Prior to Bayh-Dole, each governmental agency maintained its own respective
policy concerning the rights an inventor retained in her invention when using
government funds. 114 Proponents of Bayh-Dole sought to establish a clear and
overriding standard for determining ownership of inventions created with federal
research funds. The purpose of a uniform standard was to allow developers to focus
on innovative products, rather than on administrative tasks. 115 This uniform
standard has radically increased R&D productivity of the private sector in the United
States.116

II. ANALYSIS
The DoD is currently experiencing a crisis regarding defense-oriented
inventions. 117 It is unable to field products for the military that meet the needs of its
soldiers.118 The following section discusses various reasons posited for why soldiers
are not getting the defense-oriented products they need when they need them.
Subsection A discusses the DoD's inability to direct the research of the S&T
community. Subsection B discusses the effect that implementing reviews during a
technology's acquisition has upon lowering cost and increasing efficiency. Subsection
C explains how § 1498 can discourage innovation among the S&T community.
Lastly, subsection D summarizes the arguments presented throughout the analysis
and briefly details their advantages and disadvantages.
113See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress.Are UniversitiesAdding to the Cost
43 HouS. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2007) (noting the confusion of universities when dealing with the
different policies of government agencies prior to the enactment of Bayh-Dole).
'I Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 1676-77 (stating that prior to Bayh-Dole all twenty-eight
government agencies were allowed to set their own policies concerning whether an inventor retained
title in her invention).
115 See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 113, at 1378 (noting the strain on resources created by
administrative tasks prior to Bayh-Dole).
116 Id. at 1412 (noting the success of the Bayh-Dole Act). "There were only twenty-five active
technology transfer offices in the United States at the time the Bayh-Dole Act was passed. By the
twenty-fifth anniversary, there were 3300." Id. (citations omitted).
117 See GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-06-368, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE COST AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS UNDER DOD'S
REVISED POLICY 4 (2006) [hereinafter COST AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS] (stating the DoD's defense-

oriented products have consistently delivered performances below expectations and above cost
estimates).
The cost of developing defense-oriented products often exceeds estimates by
approximately thirty to forty percent. Id. at 2.
118 See Tyson, supra note 6 (noting the shortcomings of Interceptor body armor); see also GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-06-391, DEFENSE ACQUISTIONS: ASSESSMENTS OF
SELECTED MAJOR WEAPON PROGRAMS 3 (2006) [hereinafter ASSESSMENTS] (stating that due to the

DoD's poor acquisition of R&D, the buying power of the DoD is reduced, and soldiers get less than
promised).
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A. Inability to DirectR&D of the S&T Community
The DoD attributes the scarcity of defense-oriented technology to its inability to
specifically direct the R&D efforts of the S&T community. 119 To a certain extent, the
government no longer controls the intellectual marketplace as it once did.120 This,
however, is belied by the principles of market economics and purchasing power of the
DoD. 121 As such, while the government may no longer have unfettered access to the
majority of inventions in the United States, 122 its considerable assets should still be
123
able to sway the marketplace in favor of goods it desires.

1. The Free-MarketEconomy
Many commentators have characterized the United States as a free-market
economy.124 In a free-market economy, supply and demand determines the growth
and direction of industry.12 5 Thus, when firms within an industry determine there is
a void in the supply chain, they seek to fill the void with their products. 126 Firms do
119

See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 3.

"So right now we have a situation where the

intellectual property-that is, the patents, trademarks ... etc.-they all represent seed corn, and no
farmer wants to give up his seed corn. But, yet, the Government wants access to the processes and
results of that property .... ." Toward Greater Public-Private Collaboration in Research and
Development: How the Treatment oflntellectualProperty Rights is Minimizing Innovation in the
FederalGov..HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Technology andProcurementPolicyof the H. Comm.
on Gov. Reform, 107th Cong. 4 (July 17, 2001) [hereinafter Toward Greater Collaboration]
(statement of Jack L. Brock, Managing Director, Government Accounting Office).
120 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. GAO-01-980T, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK AND DOD'S OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITY 2 (2001)
[hereinafter INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK] (stating most research is conducted
outside of the government's governance, and that the government must now compete with others to
obtain its R&D); Cahoy, Incrementalist,supra note 20, at 594 (noting the decisions private industry
makes determines the direction of a "substantial portion" of innovation).
121See INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 120, at 23.
122 See Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 20 (stating the government is no
longer "i]n control of the R&D dollars that are invested in [the] economy.") (statement of Deidre
Lee, Director of Defense Procurement for the DoD).
123 See INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 120, at 23.
124 See Colleen R. Stumpf, Comment, Diverse Economies-Same Problems: The Struggle for
Corporate Governance, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 897, 908 (2006) (stating the world recognizes the
United States as "an advanced free-market economy." (citing Accounting Problems at WorldCom:
Hearing of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Serv.))). "[T]he United States strongly adheres to free market
economy principles...." Carole A. Scott, Money Talks: The Influence of Economic Power on the
Employment Laws and Policies in the United States and France, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 341, 398
(2006). Cf Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Board, Address at the Ronald Reagan Library
Speech:
The
Reagan
Legacy
(April 9,
2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2003/200304092/default.htm (stating President Reagan trusted Adam Smith's invisible
hand to stimulate the economy).
125 See generally HUBERT D. HENDERSON, SUPPLY AND DEMAND 37 (1922), available at
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6645700 (providing a synopsis of how supply and demand
should function in a economy).
126 See Neelie Kroes, Member, European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Address at
the Conference on Innovation and Research in Berlin: State Aid Reform: Risk Capital, Research and
Development, and Innovation 2 (April 22, 2005), http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction
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so in pursuit of profits and market-share,1 2 7 but if profits do not exceed the risks
associated with the industry, then there will be few industries attempting to fill the
void. 128 As such, those who want industry to produce certain products must ensure
that the benefits outweigh the risks. Otherwise, industry may refuse to provide
needed products and services.

2. PurchasingPower of the DoD
The DoD allocated over seventy-one billion dollars to technology and product
development in 2006.129 This qualified the DoD as the largest financer of R&D in the
federal government.,1 3 0 Yet the DoD claims it cannot direct the efforts of the S&T
community.131 The DoD's claim runs contrary to the tenets of free-market theory.
Therefore, there is an underlying problem that the DoD is failing to address.
Assuming that the United States is indeed a free-market economy, the DoD's
failure to secure technology for its products indicates one of two situations. 132 Either
the S&T community is not adequately compensated for its inventions, or the risk of
contracting with the government is too high. 133
Generally, the DoD compensates the S&T community for high-risk R&D using
three different contracts: 13 4 (1) cost-plus-award-fee ("CPAF");135 (2) fixed-price
.do?reference=SPEECH/05/251&format=PDF&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(stating
"[n]atural pressures in a market create incentives for firms" to create new products and develop new
ideas); see also William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics By Encouraging Corporate
Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2004) (stating that "[i]n regards to
consumer demand, if the price of wheat is high, consumers as a group will demand a smaller
quantity; if the price is low, consumers will demand more wheat"). There is an inverse relationship
between supply and demand. Id.
127 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
351 (C.J. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776). "[E]very man.., intends only his own
security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, he
intends only his own gain..I.." ld.
128 Billy Tauzin, President, PhRMA, Address to the American Legislative Exchange Council
Annual Dinner in San Francisco: Free Market Health Care Solutions are Best for Patients (Aug.10,
2006),
http ://www.phrma.org/about-phrma/straight-talk-from-billy-tauzin/free-market-healthcare solutions are best for patients/. "[B]usiness[es] will [only] invest money, resources and time
where the risks they take and the innovations they make are rewarded." Id.
129 See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 7 fig.1 (illustrating the government's apportionment
of 13.2 billion dollars to basic research; 13.9 billion dollars to advanced component development;
19.3 billion dollars to system development; 4 billion dollars to testing and evaluation; and, 20.6
billion dollars to operations and support).
130 See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, DOD Research Plummets
in 2008 Budget, Development Hits New Highs, in AAAS REPORT XXXII: RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FY 2008 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dod08p.pdf (stating the
DoD's R&D allotment accounts for more than half of the total federal R&D portfolio).
131 See BEST PRACTICES, supranote 25, at 3.
1:32See supratext accompanying note 124.
133 See Tauzin, supra note 128 (noting the tension inherent in a free market economy between
risk and reward).
134 See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. GAO-06-66, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: DOD
HAS PAID BILLIONS IN AWARD AND INCENTIVE FEES REGARDLESS OF ACQUISITION OUTCOMES 11-13
[hereinafter BILLIONS] (2005). Transactions other than those for R&D can also fall under these
kinds of contracts. Id. at 10.
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incentive("FPI");136 and 3) cost-plus-incentive-fee ("CPIF").137 While these contracts
138
2 6
comprise only 4.6% of DoD transactions, they are apportioned 0. % of the budget.
Of this amount, the government allocates over eight billion dollars to providing
139
incentives and awards to its contractors.
However, despite the government's efforts to entice R&D firms, a GAO study
140
showed that these incentive and award contracts are not effective motivators.
141
Moreover, contractors still feel that contracting with the government is too risky.
While the government's approach has been to entice the S&T community with
monetary awards, it is clear this is not working. 142 Additionally, increasing the
monetary awards for government contracts is not a viable option. 143 Therefore, the
government must lower the associated risks.

B. Failureto Execute a Review Proeess
The GAO has consistently argued 144 that the lack of an effective review process
results in inefficient product development, high costs, and delayed schedules 145 in
defense-oriented products. 146 In recommending a review process, the GAO cites the
review processes of successful businesses as a model the DoD should aspire to

135 See 48 C.F.R. 16.305 (2007); see also BILLIONS, supra note 134, app. at 46 (stating a CPAF
reimburses the inventor for qualified expenses incurred during R&D; alongside a fixed base amount
and an award amount intended to provide motivation for excellence). Roughly half of the contracts
in the GAO study population were CPAFs. Id. at 10.
136 See 48 C.F.R. 16.403; see also BILLIONS, supra note 134, app. at 47 (stating a FPJ provides
for a final contract price through the use of a formula based on the final negotiated cost in relation
to the total target cost).
137 See 48 C.F.R. 16.405-1; see also BILLIONS, supra note 134, app. at 46 (stating a CPIF
reimburses the cost of research to the contractor in addition to a fee adjusted by a formula based
upon the relation of total allowable costs to target costs).
138 BILLIONS, supra note 134, at 10 fig. 1 (stating that 4.9% of the budget is 157 billion dollars).
These contracts are awarded in an effort to '[e]ncourage defense contractors to perform in an
innovative, efficient, and effective way in areas deemed important." Id. at 1.
139 Id. at 3.
110
Id. (stating that award and incentive-type contracts have generally not been effective
motivators for the S&T community, or even traditional supply and service contractors as a whole).
141 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. GAO06533SP, HIGHLIGHTS OF A
GAO FORUM: MANAGING THE SUPPLIER BASE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (2006) [hereinafter SUPPLIER
BASE].
142 See generallyBILLIONS, supra note 134, at 3-5.
"1 See U.S. Nat'l Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt-clock/ (stating the National Debt is
9,112,950,213,089 dollars) (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
144 COST AND SCHEDULE PROBLEMS, supra note 117, at 4 (noting that the GAO has criticized
the DoD for failure to deliver a plethora of promised defense-oriented products on-time for three
decades).
145 See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 1; see also CASE FOR CHANGE, supra note 28, at 2
tbl.1 (noting the reduced buying power of the DoD as a result of ballooning costs to manufacture
defense -oriented products and accompanying schedule delays).
146BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25, at 25 (stating the DoD lacks a "[s]tructured, gated process
for managing technology development").
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However, while the GAO's recommendations are valid, they fail to address

the underlying problems concerning defense acquisitions. Instead, the DoD should
confront these underlying problems which include the DoD's actual business
practices that result in high overhead and slow progress for all parties involved.

1. Gated Reviews
The review process recommended by the GAO provides three major stages that a
new technological invention must proceed through before it can be implemented in a
product. 148 These stages consist of "exploring," "developing," and "transitioning" the
technology. 149 Before a technology isallowed to progress from one stage to another,
it must meet all of the criteria called for in the previous stage. 150 For instance,
among other conditions, a technology must prove itself functional in an operating
environment during the "transitioning" stage before being implemented in a
151
battlefield ready product.
Under the current system, this process will most likely decrease the amount of
time it takes for defense-oriented products to reach soldiers. 152 However, this process
may do little, if anything, to affect the maturity of technology coming into the DoD, or
the amount that technology costs. The GAO has stated, "[tihe challenge for DoD ...
lies not only in the 'how to' aspects of technology transition, but also in creating
stronger and more uniform incentives that encourage the S&T and acquisition
communities to work together to deliver mature technologies to programs ."153
Therefore, the DoD should look to its business practices, and not its reviews, to
154
deliver mature technologies at a lower price for its defense-oriented products.

147 [d. at 2 (stating the GAO interviewed lab and product line managers at Boeing, IBM,
Motorola, and 3M in an effort to identify strategies for ensuring only mature technologies enter
product development).
148

Id. at 12 fig. 4.

I 9 Id.
150 Id.at

12-15.
151 See id. at 13-14 (stating technologies should be proven to be acceptable to the product line,
able to meet performance requirements, and capable of being produced on a large scale before being
implemented in a product).
152 See generally id.at 8 (noting programs that begin with mature technology only average a
4.8% cost growth, but programs that begin with immature technology average nearly 35% cost
growth). The GAO has found a link between cost growth and the late delivery of weapons systems.

Id.
153 Id.at 4; see JACQUES S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 245 (MIT Press 1989). ('[A]s in the
commercial world, the buyer-seller relationship in the world of defense must ... be an honest
business relationship, with joint interests, in which the buyer gets a good product at a fair cost and
the seller makes a decent profit.").

154

Nancy K. Sumption, Other Transactions:Meeting the Departmentof Defense's Oblectives,

28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 365, 375 (1999) (stating top commercial firms are unwilling to work with the
government).
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2. The DoD's Business Practices

In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that the "DoD must have
unimpeded access to commercial technologies
."155 Yet the DoD only contracts
with eight percent of available research-oriented commercial firms. 156
The
remaining ninety-two percent claim to have little or no involvement in conducting
157
R&D for the DoD.
Firms cite the cost of doing business with the DoD as an overriding factor in
deciding whether to deal with them. 158 A 1994 study revealed that the cost of
complying with federal regulations amounted to an eighteen percent loss of profit
margins for firms.1 59 Other studies indicated losses as high as forty percent or
more. 160 These figures suggest that the DoD, to attract these firms, should lower the
cost associated with doing business with it.161
Otherwise, these expensive
regulations may result in the U.S. military failing to succeed on the battlefield due to
162
a lack of technologically advanced defense-oriented products.
One of the most conspicuous cost-drivers in dealing with the government is its
requirement of management reviews.1 63 These reviews are intended to provide highlevel DoD officials with the ability to oversee a project's progress. However, the
amount of effort that is expended in preparing for the reviews wastes time and
money. 164 There is a great deal of effort required to prepare regular presentations for
superiors that are impressive enough to ensure future funding for a project. 165 The
resources expended in what amounts to intergovernmental advertising could be put
to better use in actually supervising and overseeing a project, as opposed to
155Id.at 379.
15(;
Id.at 378.
157

Id,

158See generally DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOD REGULATORY COST PREMIUM: A QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT

1

(1994)

[hereinafter

QUANTITATIVE

ASSESSMENT],

available at

http:/handle.

dtic.mil/100.2/ADA295799.
159See id. at 47 (noting this cost of compliance can be reduced by identifying and changing ten
key factors in the Federal Regulations that impute tremendous costs with little gain); see Sumption,
suprn note 154, at 372-73 (noting that following World War II, the defense industry became laden
with government procurement regulations in an effort to curb waste, corruption and abuse).
160QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 158, at 94 (stating the wide disparity between the
percentages involve taking different accounting methods into account).
161See SMITH, supra note 127, at 20 ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves ... to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages.").
162 Walter B. LaBerge, Restructuring Dol: Study the High-Tech Commercial World, 1
ACQUISITION REV. Q. 12, 17 (1994) ("W]ithout any military-industrial complexes of their
own ... [terrorists] probably can arm themselves better than the Soviets of the olden days. The
USSR of yesteryear had to use only the products of its own industrial capacity. [Terrorists] now can
buy from them or the rest of the world."), availahble at http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/arq94.asp.
163
John T. Dillard, Toward Centralized ControlofDefense Acquisition Programs,40 DEFENSE
ACQUISITION REV. J. 331, 338 (2005) [hereinafter Centralized ControA (stating that a substantial
amount of funding [i]s expended on such items as government agency or support contractor
assistance with supporting analyses and documentation, presentation materials, frequent flights to
the pentagon, and other associated expenses in preparation for high-level reviews").
104 See id.
165See supratext accompanying note 163.
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preparing a myriad of presentations and reports. 166 Furthermore, the review system
currently in place may be unfit for procuring technology needed to conduct the global
war on terrorism. 167 Because the money spent on oversight is a burden on both the
S&T community and the DoD, the government should look to change its business
practices to be less onerous. An improvement in these business practices may lead to
more companies' willingness to contract with the government. 168 Consequently, the
additional competition between potential contractors could lead to lower prices and
increased innovation. 169

3. The PotentialEffects of the DoD ChangingIts Business Practices
The DoD should change its business practices in order to tap into the potential of
the ninety-two percent of firms not currently doing business with it.170 Such action
would likely improve the cost of R&D and the development of defense-oriented
products more than the review system contemplated by the GAO.171 Subpart (a)
discusses the effect a change in business practices may have on the cost of defenseoriented products. Subpart (b) then contemplates the potential for improved product
development if the DoD implements a change in business practices. Both sections
are concerned with the negative effect that Acquisition Regulations ("ARs")172 can
have in attracting members of the S&T community to develop products for the DoD.

166See CentralizedControl,supra note 163, at 338.
107 Id. at 341 (stating the centralized decision-making process in use by the DoD was consistent
with U.S. tactics and needs during the cold war, but that same decision-making process is now
"stifling and can restrict innovation").
168See goene-ally Colonel Robert P. Birmingham & Edward W. Rogers, A Ten-Year Review of
the Vision for Transforming The Defense Acquisition System, 1 DEFENSE ACQUISITION REV. J. 36, 41
(2004) [hereinafter Ten-Year Review] (stating the DoD must '[reduce] overhead and support
structures by bringing the revolution in

business affairs to [the] DoD ...." (quoting WILLIAM

COHEN, DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVE REPORT ii (November, 1997), available at,http://www.fas.org/
man/docs/dri/intro.html)).
169See discussion infra Part JI.B.3.a.
170See Sumption, supra note 154, at 378, 412 (stating government procurement regulations
have created a situation of "bounded" competition because the government is not contracting with
those who can necessarily do the best job; instead, the government is doing business with those
companies who have the system in place to adequately deal with the government acquisition
regulations).
171 See Ten-Year Review, supra note 168, at 50 (stating the military is struggling to keep up
with technological developments due to a disinterest on the part of commercial developers and the
"cumbersome" DoD acquisition regulations).
172 Both the Federal Acquisition Regulations and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations
Supplement are separate entities and can effect the acquisition of defense-oriented products. See
About DFARS and PGI, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/about-dfarspgi.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2007) (stating "DFARS contains ... deviations from FAR requirements, and policies/procedures that
have a significant effect on the public").
For the sake of simplicity, both DFARS and FARs are
referred to jointly as "ARs" for the bulk of this comment. However, a footnote concerning an AR will
cite to the exact provision it concerns, whether it is a Federal Acquisition Regulation or a Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation.
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a. The Cost offDefense-OrientedProducts
Lowering the barriers erected by financially crippling ARs may entice additional
members of the S&T community to contract with the government. 173 This incentive
will likely result in an increased amount of competition for R&D contracts, 174 and
prices may drop due to this additional competition. 175 The net result would be a
significant savings for the government. This would allow the DoD to dedicate more
resources to procuring additional defense-oriented products for soldiers.

b. Improved ProductDevelopment
Increased interest of research-oriented firms may also result in more efficient
product development and greater innovation. 176 This may occur because competition
177
encourages firms to innovate in an effort to draw attention to their products.
178
However, the majority of R&D firms opt not to do business with the United States.
It has been suggested that the true loss this represents "[i]s the loss of alternatives,
the loss of ideas, and the loss of competitive solutions for DoD programs and
needs." 179 To combat this trend of non-participation, the government should lower
the risk factors associated with doing business with it. Such risk-reduction could be
accomplished by changing the regulations governing acquisition of inventions for the
government. This would be consistent with the intent of Bayh-Dole and would likely
result in increased productivity of R&D firms.

C Section 1498 DiscouragesInnovation in Defense -OrientedProducts
The S&T community has shown itself to be a risk-averse population.180 The
legislature has acknowledged this finding and has admitted that the government's
treatment of intellectual property profoundly affects the S&T community's perception
173 Soo Drennan, supra note 126, at 1062-63 (noting that favorable market conditions will
cause new producers to enter the market).
174 See SUPPLIER BASE, supra note 141, at 5 (stating that as the defense supplier base
dwindled, competition was reduced and cost containment became more difficult); see also Sumption,
supra note 154, at 412 (stating the "bound system" results in pre-positioned contractors who merely
comply with the tenets of ARs and implying that if the system were to lower its barriers, competition

would result).
175 See supratext accompanying note 37.
176 GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-07-656T, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
ANALYSIS OF COSTS FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ENGINE PROGRAM 8 (2007) (stating competition
from other contractors encourages companies to achieve steeper production learning curves, produce
more reliable products, and invest additional corporate funds into technological improvements to
remain competitive).
177 Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 2. "It is axiomatic that competition
increases innovation in an effort to offer more attractive options to the consumer at lower prices."
Id.
178 See Sumption, supra note 154, at 379.
179 Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 40 (statement of Richard W. Carroll,
Chairman, Small Bus. Tech. Coal.).
180 See supraPart II.A.2.ii.
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of the risks involved in contracting with the government.1 81 Yet despite this
admission, § 1498 has not been amended to allow inventors to recoup the full extent
of their losses following a government taking. 182 Instead, history has shown that
plaintiffs may only recover a reasonable royalty for the government's
infringement.1 8 3 This judicial interpretation of § 1498184 has led to a decreased
amount of defense-oriented inventions i8 5 and the wholesale movement of R&D firms
away from the DoD.18 6 In order to combat these disturbing trends, the government
must take action to encourage the S&T community to once again produce technology
for the United States.1 8 7 Failure to do this may translate into defeat on the
battlefield, and the needless loss of soldiers' lives.

D. The S&T CommunityMust Be Enticed To Invent for the Government Again
It is apparent that "[t]he drafters of the U.S. Constitution recognized
188
that ... inventions provide the lifeblood for a strong and thriving nation."
Unfortunately, current legislation undervalues the importance of intellectual
property required for supporting American troops in combat. While it is true that the
U.S. government has attempted to attract R&D firms with innovative initiatives like
the Small Business Innovation Research Program ("SBIRs")189 and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA");190 neither initiative is sufficient to
attract the bulk of the S&T sector. 191 For instance, while SBIRs allows smaller R&D

See Toward GreaterCollaboration,supra note 119, at 2.
See supra notes 62, 75 and accompanying text.
183See supratext accompanying note 77.
184 Cf supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (illustrating the role the judiciary has played
in whether lost profits are to be considered in litigation under § 1498).
185See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for
the World,in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
68, 77-78 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds. 1993) (explaining that resources will not be allocated to
research in weak intellectual property systems because the results can be taken by others).
186 See Butler, supra note 18, at 498 (noting that the Army "harmed the interest it was
supposed to further" when it took title away from Campbell Plastics).
187AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, THE INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT, http://www.afa.org/media/reports/
future7.asp (stating the inability of the military to convince the S&T community to produce defenseoriented inventions has led to a "gap in the innovation system for mid and long-term R&D which
threatens to dry up the wells of new technology") (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
188 Brief for Information Technology Industry Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(No. 961327).
189 See 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006). "Itis the policy of the Congress that assistance be given to
small-business concerns to enable them to undertake and to obtain the benefits of research and
development .. " Id. § 638(a).
190 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Directive 5134.10 (Feb. 17, 1995) (listing DARPA's responsibilities,
functions
and relationships
within the DoD);
see also DARPA Over the Years,
http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (providing a brief history of
the agency).
191 See Sumption, supra note 154, at 378 (noting ninety-two percent of firms refuse to work
with the DoD).
181

182
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firms access to the government's funds, 192 the program still subjects those firms to
harsh punishment for failure to meet reporting requirements. 193 Meanwhile,
although contracting with DARPA poses an attractive alternative for firms unwilling
194
to function within both the traditional DoD acquisition infrastructure and ARs,
DARPA's relatively small budget of roughly three billion dollars only permits the
agency to assist a limited number of R&D firms. 195 Therefore, since neither SBIRs
nor DARPA alone is capable of attracting sufficient interest within the S&T
community, the U.S. government must revise its treatment of intellectual property in
order to maintain technological superiority.
Various commentators have posited that the dearth of defense-oriented products
is due to the loss of the government's ability to sway the S&T community, and a
poorly executed review process. 196 However, further analysis reveals that these
problems are the superficial manifestations of an underlying problem.
The root of the problem is that the current laws controlling government
acquisition of intellectual property have become outdated. 197 These laws were
drafted in a time when the majority of R&D in the United States was conducted by,
and for, the government. 198 However, this is no longer the case. 199 If the U.S.
military expects to continue its dominance in world affairs, these laws must be
updated to encourage innovation in the S&T community.200

III. PROPOSAL
The current governmental statutory and regulatory scheme is not conducive to
attracting commercial firms to the DoD. 20 1 The laws governing acquisition of
intellectual property are antiquated. 20 2 Moreover, commercial firms refuse to
contract with the DoD, citing overly prescriptive contract terms and unprofitable
192 See The Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer
Programs, http://grantsl.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr-programs.htm
(noting that government
agencies with budgets over one hundred million dollars are required to set aside 2.5% of their
budget for small businesses). Small businesses are characterized as those having less than fivehundred employees. Id.
193 See 37 C.F.R. 401.14(d) (2006) (stating the government may take title in a subject invention
for the failure of a SBIRs participant to disclose the discovery of a subject invention).
194 See Sumption, supra note 157, at 381 (noting "DARPA's unconventional government
structure allows it to act quickly and decisively ... and take advantage of opportunities in
technology and processes").

195 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2008/2009 BUDGET ESTIMATES

(2007), available at http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/fy08_budg-est.pdf (stating the budget for 2008 is
projected to be 3,085,617,000 dollars).
196 See discussion supraPart II.B. 1.
197 See Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 4 (statement of Jack L. Brock,
Managing Dir. of Acquisition and Sourcing Mgmt., GAO) (stating legislation in regard to intellectual
property rights in the United States has grown "static" and "stale").
198 INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 120, at 1.
199 Id. (stating most research being conducted now occurs outside of the government's control).

See text accompanying supranote 25.
Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Heberling, Defense Industrial Base Policy.*Revisited, 1
ACQUISITION REV. Q. 238, 240 (Spring 1994). The primary barriers to attracting the private sector
are "regulatory and bureaucratic." Id.
202 See supratext accompanying note 197.
200
201
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transactions. 20 3 In order to reverse this trend, the government must change the way
it treats the intellectual property of its contractors. 204 To effect such a change, the
government must accomplish three things: (1) modify § 1498 to either provide for a
minimum percentage awarded to plaintiffs or explicitly provide for a recovery of lost
profits; (2) change the ARs to acknowledge the value of commercial vendors'
intellectual property; and (3) annul burdensome oversight regulations imposed on
contractors. These changes may encourage contractors to once again provide the
20 5
DoD with innovative solutions to modern problems encountered on the battlefield.

A. Modify § 1498
Current legislation and judicial interpretation of § 1498 limits an inventor's
recovery for infringement to a reasonable royalty. 20 6 This, however, does not always
adequately reflect the damage inflicted upon an infringed patent-holder, specifically
in the case with a government infringement. 20 7 This section proposes modifying
§ 1498 to ensure the S&T community is properly compensated for its investment in
new technology. Subsection 1 proposes a minimum percentage that all patentholders would receive as an award for the infringement of their patent. Subsection 2
proposes, as an alternative, explicitly authorizing an award of lost profits for
infringement in actions against the government. Utilizing either approach will
reassure members of the S&T community that they will be fully compensated in a
case of governmental infringement.

203 See Sumption, supra text accompanying note 159; see also Maintaining Technological
Supremacy, supra note 7, at 231 (stating Hewlett-Packard will no longer contract with the
government, even if a project is "sufficiently intriguing technically" because it is not worth the
administrative burden).
"The maze of rules deters many companies from bidding on any
government R&D projects." Id.
204 Patent Reexamination and Small Business Innovation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intelleetual Property of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1
(June 20, 2002). "Just as technology has evolved over time, the patent law must evolve as well.
Every generation, we must ask ourselves whether our laws allow for innovation to prosper in light of
the reality and trends in research and commerce." Id.; see Toward Greater Collaboration, supra
note 119, at 2 (stating seventy-five percent of the nations top information technology companies
refuse to contract with the government due to its treatment of intellectual property).
205 Sutton, supra note 7, at 235 (stating that synergy between civilian and military sectors can
provide significant cost savings to the government and strengthen the S&T base in the United
States).
206 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006); Lipson, supra note 61, at 257 (stating a reasonable royalty is the
preferred award for infringement); see Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, at 348 (noting
an award of lost profits may overcompensate a plaintiff).
207 NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 1-2. "Innovation requires substantial financial investment
and effort over a long period of time and uses scarce resources." Id. Industry relies on its
intellectual property in order to recoup the initial costs of research and development. Id.
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1. Amend § 1498 to AwardA Minimum Percentage
Section 1498 provides little or no guidance concerning the appropriate award for
damages in the case of infringement by the government. 20 8 Consequently, courts
have adopted their own measure for damages without the benefit of an overarching
framework or rules. 20 9 These court-manufactured measures lead to unpredictable
and inconsistent awards for infringement. 2 10 This situation is exacerbated by a
reluctance to award anything other than a reasonable royalty for infringement. 2 11 To
mediate the possibly harsh consequences 212 of an arbitrary royalty amount, § 1498
should specify a minimum fifteen percent royalty to be awarded to patent-holders in
213
the case of governmental infringement.

a. Fifteen PercentRoyalty
The award of a minimum fifteen percent royalty for government infringement of
a patent would be neither arbitrary nor unfair. 214 The government itself states that
such an award is an appropriate incentive to reward government employees for their
inventions produced "on-the-job." 215 Furthermore, awarding this amount "rewards
scientific, engineering, and technical employees," "furthers scientific exchange," and
provides funding "for scientific research and development." 216 These prospective
results embody the ideal outcome of a successful patent infringement case against
the government.
With a guaranteed minimum award, companies would receive the assurance
that their efforts will be compensated by a "reasonable and entire" amount. This will
alleviate industry fears that DoD-specific research will not be profitable because of a
potential government taking. 217 Also, by lowering the risk associated with producing
DoD-specific technology, the government will encourage an increase in the number of

208 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (providing an award for damages should provide for "reasonable and
entire compensation").
209 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),

afFd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (providing for the use of
hypothetical negotiations between the patent-holder and infringer, prior to any infringement).
210 See supratext accompanying note 71.
211 Lipson, supra note 61, at 257.
212 E.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 491 (Ct. Cl. 1994) (awarding one
percent of the cost of the entire spacecraft as a reasonable royalty).
213 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(A)(i) (2006) (stating "at least" fifteen percent of royalties should be
dispersed to a government employed inventor for the licensing of their invention by the
government).
214 Id.
215 Id,

216

Id. §§ 3710c(B)(i), (ii), (v).

See supra Section II.A.2.b; see also Schlitz & McGrath, supra note 49, at 360 (noting that in
litigation the government often proposes royalties far below the actual value of the infringed
invention); see also supratext accompanying note 128; cf Toward GreaterCollaboration,supra note
119, at 50. "New ideas with the benefit of intellectual property protection... [empower companies]
to grow strong, challenge the status quo, and change the world." Id. (statement of Richard W.
Carrol, Chairman, Small Business Technology Coalition).
217
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R&D firms vying for contracts, thereby reducing costs and providing much-needed
218
innovation.

b. PotentialCriticism
The application of a fifteen percent minimum award for a reasonable royalty will
likely be seen as overly mechanical in nature. 219 Additionally, many legal authorities
may assert that a fifteen percent minimum is, in fact, over-compensation for patentholders. 220 As such, due to the problems associated with an "automatic" fifteen
percent award, the government could instead award lost profits to plaintiffs. This
remedy would afford judges the opportunity to exercise their best judgment in
221
awarding damages.

2. Amend § 1498 to Explicitly Include Lost Profits

The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the award of lost profits has always
been premised on the attempt to fully compensate a patent owner for actual
monetary losses occurring as a result of infringement." 222 Awarding lost profits in
appropriate circumstances 223 may reduce the perceived risk of inventing defenseoriented technologies for the government. If this occurred, contractors would be more
willing to contract with the government and create innovative defense-oriented
technology. Additionally, awarding lost profits to plaintiffs would encourage the
government to do business with the patent-holder, as opposed to an infringing
218 Seo Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 2 (stating increased competition
forces companies to innovate). But see Cahoy, Incrementalist,supra note 20, at 628 n.169 (I]n
some economies, stronger patent laws do not necessarily indicate more R&D investment ..
" (citing
Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15
CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 51, 60 (1997))).
219 Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe.'A Law of PersonalJurisdiction,68 MO. L. REV. 753,
760 n.26 (stating fairness should transcend the mechanical application of law to avoid unjust
outcomes (citing DAVID R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 184 (1999))); cf

Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining Judicial Rescues." The Role of Outreach and Capacity-Building
Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals,45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547, 558 (2005) ("[L]aw entails far more than the
mechanical application of static legal technicalities; it involves an evolutionary search for those
institutions and processes that will best facilitate authentic stability through justice." (quoting NEIL
KRITZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE POSTCONFLICT PHASE: BUILDING A STABLE PEACE, IN MANAGING
GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 587, 588 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 1996)).
220 See Lipson, supra note 61, at 254 (stating remedies considered proper between private
litigants are considered to be in excess of the just compensation provided for by the Fifth
Amendment, and the reasonable and entire compensation provided for by § 1498 in suits against the
government).
221 See supratext accompanying note 219.
222 Cahoy, Cipro, supra note 41, at 163; see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648,
654-55 (1983) (stating Congress intended for patent owners to receive full compensation for "any
damages" suffered as a result of infringement).
223 Id. at 164-65 (stating lost profits are appropriate when the inventor has established a policy
to maintain her patent monopoly by not licensing other companies or persons to use the patent, or
by granting licenses only under certain restrictive conditions).

[7:171 2007]

Yesterday's Technology, Tomorrow

competitor. 224 In some cases, the government would otherwise be liable to the
patent-holder for infringement and liable to the competing infringing contractor for
the cost of goods provided.
Ultimately, the use of lost profits could result in increased good will between the
government and the S&T community. This rapport would cause an increase in the
number of companies producing technology for the government as a whole. 225 As
such, the government should explicitly state the validity of lost profit damages in
§ 1498 in order to reduce the risk of contracting with the government and to increase
competition.

B.

ChangeAcquisition Regulations to Acknowledge the Value
of Inventors'IntellectualProperty

Current DoD Acquisition Regulations ("ARs") discourage the S&T community
from conducting R&D for the government. 226
Current ARs overly favor the
227
government and do not acknowledge the value of intellectual property to inventors.
228
Therefore, the risks of contracting with the government far outweigh the benefits.
However, modifying key elements of the ARs can remedy this situation.229

1. ProposedChanges to Acquisition Regulations
Generally, ARs are considered negotiable terms of government contracts that
can be changed to suit the needs of the S&T community. 230 However, the "default
position" of many of these ARs often denies adequate protection to intellectual

224

See id. at 168 ("Without a requirement that full compensation be paid, the obvious incentive

for the government is to take private property for a short term benefit to society but to the detriment
of the patent owner (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 59-9 (4th ed. 1992))).
225 See Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur
Teohnologioal Changon (Economic Growth Center, Yale University, Working Paper No. 831, 2001),
available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth-pdf/cdp831.pdf (concluding there is a strong causal
connection between the protection afforded intellectual property and private sector investment in
R&D).
226 SUPPLIER BASE, supra note 141, at 7 (stating the challenge of operating under FARs
discourages innovative businesses from contracting with the government); see NAVIGATING, supra
note 100, at 4-5 (stating the government is having difficulty attracting R&D firms to conduct
government research due to its use of traditional intellectual property clauses and sometimes
overbearing procurement methods).
227 See SUPPLIER BASE, supra note 141, at 8 (noting that inventors are often at a disadvantage
when contracting with the government under the current scheme).
228 Id. (stating the existing acquisition system creates an imbalance between risks and rewards
for potential government contractors).
229 LaBerge, supra note 162, at 14 (stating businesses must change their strategies depending
upon their marketplace position). Strategies employed by actors dominating a marketplace are
fundamentally different than strategies used by those who do not. Id. The government no longer
dominates the R&D sector and as such, it should change its ARs to reflect this fact. See id.
230 See NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-6 (stating the only provisions of a government
contract that cannot be waived or modified are the Government-purpose license and march-in
rights).
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As a result, these regulations often impede contracts between the

government and commercial R&D firms.

2 32

This section proposes: (1) amending the ARs to provide for a minimum
percentage of capital the government must provide before acquiring rights in
inventions conceived prior to a government contract; 233 and (2) annulling clauses in
234
ARs that waive governmental immunity for unauthorized disclosure.

a. Inventions Conceived Priorto a Government Contract

Currently, the government enjoys a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable,
paid-up license" to any subject invention produced under contract. 23 5 This includes
any invention first conceived or reduced to practice during the course of the
contract. 236 However, this policy fails to acknowledge the significant investment a
company may have already made in a technology prior to contracting with the
government. 23 7 Additionally, this policy is inconsistent with commercial R&D
agreements. 238
Under current law, the government will receive an irrevocable
license in any product conceived prior to the R&D contract.239
This policy discourages commercial R&D firms from contracting with the
government. 240 In order to reassure firms that they are not gambling with their
intellectual property, the legislature should establish a percentage of R&D that the

government must fund ("watermark") prior to asserting rights to a pre-conceived
invention. This would encourage companies to contract with the government, and
241
expose the government to further innovation in defense-oriented products.

231 Sharp, supra note 88, at 126-27 (noting that the Government receives unlimited rights in
technical data "unless the contractor takes affirmative steps to limit such rights"); see Toward
Greater Collaboration,supra note 119, at 65 (stating contractors can lose their intellectual property
rights if they do not properly understand the ARs governing government contracts).
232 See NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at iii (stating companies will not risk jeopardizing their
intellectual property in order to comply with Government ARs).
233 See 48 C.F.R. 52.227-12(a) (2006) (stating the government may take an interest in any
subject invention first reduced to practice during the course of the contract).
234 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 252.227-7039
(2006) (waiving government immunity in case of unauthorized disclosure of technical data by the
government).
235 48 C.F.R. 52.227-13(c)(1)(i).
236 48 C.F.R. 52.227-13(a).
2:7See NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-7 (stating that a potentially small contract performed

for the government can jeopardize the significant monies invested in an invention due to FARs
52.227-13(a) and 52.227-13(c)(1)(i)).
238 Toward Greater Collaboration,supra note 119, at 72 (stating in commercial transactions,
the rights to an invention are determined by the person who conceived the invention, not whoever
reduced the invention to practice) (statement of Richard N. Kuyath, Counsel, 3M Corp.).
2:39NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-7.
240 Id.
241 Toward Greater Collaboration, supra note 119, at 70 (noting that of the top twenty-five
companies receiving patents in 1998, there were no traditional defense contractors listed, and
further stating that the top three commercial U.S. companies gathered a total of over 5,000 patents,
whereas the top five defense contractors only received 579 patents) (statement of Richard N.
Kuyath).
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A. PotentialCriticism
Requiring the government to reach a watermark before asserting rights in an
invention will likely be subject to much criticism.

242

Many members of the public

may believe that a watermark will effectively result in the public paying twice for an
243
invention, without a guarantee that the government will receive its license.

Additionally, there is a risk that contractors may attempt to stay below the
watermark in order to avoid having the government assert its rights in a subject
invention, while concurrently receiving the benefits of the additional funding.
While both concerns are legitimate, they must be balanced against the United
States' need to remain dominant on the battlefield.
Also, any amendments
concerning a watermark provision could be limited to a set period of time, after which
the watermark provision would automatically expire. This would alleviate fears that
the public would be indefinitely subsidizing "greedy" contractors, while also
assuaging the fears of risk-averse defense contractors.

c. Modifying and Annulling DFARS 252.227-7013
Current provisions in DFARS 252.227-7013 discourage contractors from
entering into R&D for the government.2 44 This subpart proposes (i) explicitly
limiting access to government data to agencies that would actually require such
knowledge, and (ii) eliminating provisions that waive government liability for
unauthorized disclosure of technical data. These proposed changes may convince the
S&T community to contract with the government.

1. Limiting Access Within the Government

Depending upon the amount of funding provided by a governmental agency, the
government receives certain rights in contractors' technical data.2
2 46

rights are not limited to the contracting agency.

45

However, these

Instead, any governmental

212 Cf David Halperin, The Bayh Dole Act and Mareh-in Rights 3 (May, 2001) (on file at the
National Institute of Health), available at ott.od.nih.gov/policy/meeting/David-Halperin-AttorneyCounselor.pdf (noting the criticism that initially attached to the Bayh-Dole Act because "itseems to
require the public to pay twice for the same invention ...").
243 Cf id. (stating the public already has to pay for federally funded inventions twice; once
when taxes are used to fund R&D, and again via high prices due to a monopoly on the invention and
limited supply).
244 NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-13-4-15 (stating contractors are reluctant to give the
entire government access to their technical data and dislike the government's waiver of liability for
unauthorized disclosure of technical data).
245 Sharp, supra note 88, at 123-24. The government retains "unlimited rights" if the technical
data rights were developed exclusively with government funding. Id. The government attains
government-purpose rights if there was mixed funding. Id. The government retains limited rights if
an invention was funded exclusively by the private sector. Id.
246 See

U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SUPP. 252.227-

7013(b)(1)-(b)(3) (2006) (stating technical data rights are extended to the government as a whole).
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agency has access to technical data received through a contract. 247 This concerns
contractors who depend upon their technical data to maintain a competitive
advantage. 248 To encourage the S&T community to contract with the government,
the dissemination of these rights should be limited to the agencies reasonably
expected to need them.
This will lower the risk posed by the widespread
249
dissemination of technical data.

ii. Eliminatingthe Waiver of Government Liability
Current ARs also waive the government's liability for the unauthorized
disclosure of technical data rights. 250 However, as there is no liability for the
unauthorized disclosure of technical data rights, the contractors fear the government
will not enact appropriate safeguards. 251 Thus, since the government is in the best
position to determine who may gain access to a contractor's technical data rights, it
should accept responsibility for the unauthorized disclosure of those rights. This will
encourage the S&T community to contract with the government.

C. Annul Burdensome OversightRegulations
Reviews are necessary to ensure that projects remain goal-oriented, and cost
effective. 252 However, commercial R&D firms see the current implementation of
these reviews as burdensome and costly. 253 In order to lessen the burden associated
with these reviews, the government should implement these reviews only when a
major milestone occurs in the development process. 254 Doing so would bring the
review process in accord with the simpler, less burdensome review process
promulgated by the DoD in 1996.255 This would bring forth an additional benefit of

247

Id.

C. NASH & LEONARD RACWICZ, TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS 27 (5th ed. 2001) (stating
technical data rights are often closely held in the commercial sector because their dissemination to
competitors could place the contractor's competitive advantage in jeopardy).
248 RALPH

24)

See generally Ron Nixon, US. Database Exposed Thousands of Social Security Numbers,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, at A10 (noting the government accidentally released over 30,000 records
containing Social Security numbers through an Internet portal accessible to the general public).
250 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. SuPP. 252.227-7013(b)(6)
(2006) (stating the government shall be released from liability for the unauthorized disclosure of
technical data rights by third parties).
251 NAVIGATING, supra note 100, at 4-14 (stating contractors do not believe government
employees "will adequately protect confidential or proprietary information").
252 See generallysupra Part II.B. .; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 25.
253 QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 158, at 94; see supra text accompanying note 163;
ci Centralized Control, supra note 163, at 339 fig.6 (depicting the complexity of the current review
process and the over-abundance of meetings required to advance a project).
254 Centralized Control, supra note 163, at 340 (noting a recommendation made to the
government to reduce the number of reviews and milestones).
255 See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Directive 5000.2-R (March, 1996); see also Centralized Control,
supra note 163, at 336 (noting the 1996 procurement model was "simple" and "streamlined,"
requiring less reviews and posing less of a burden on contractors than the present model).
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providing an incentive for the S&T community to contract with the DoD, while also
256
lowering overhead for all parties involved.

CONCLUSION

America relies upon its technological superiority when engaging enemies on the
battlefield. 257 However, an intractable government intellectual property policy has
258
led to decreasing innovation for the DoD from the commercial sector.
Exacerbating the situation is the approaching obsolescence of many Cold War era
weapon systems. 259 In order to reverse this trend, the United States should: (I)
modify § 1498 to allow for a minimum award, or alternatively, lost profits; 260 (2)
acknowledge the importance of intellectual property to commercial entities by
modifying the ARs and Bayh-Dole to reflect that importance; 261 and (3) make the
acquisition process less burdensome.262

256
257
258
2')
260
201
2 2

See generally CentralizedControl,supra note 163, at 338.
See text accompanying note 25.
See discussion supraSection JI.B.2.
See text accompanying note 7.
See discussion supraSection III.A. 1.
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
See discussion supraSection III.C.

